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Abstract. This note is an extended read of my read of Laplace’s book The´orie
Analytique des Probabilite´s, when considered from a Bayesian viewpoint but with-
out historical nor comparative pretentions. A deeper analysis is provided in Dale
(1999).
1 Introduction
“The theory of probabilities draws a remarkable distinction between observations
which have been made, and those which are to be made.” A. de Morgan, Dublin
Review, 1837.
Pierre Simon Laplace’s book, The´orie Analytique des Probabilite´s, was first pub-
lished in 1812, that is, exactly two centuries ago! Following a suggestion by the editor
of the ISBrA Bulletin, I gladly accepted the invitation as (a) Laplace’s role in Bayesisian
statistics is much deeper and longlasting than Bayes’ (Dale, 1982, 1999), (b) I had never
looked at this book and so this was a perfect opportunity to do so, using the 1812 edition
in my possession, and (c) I was curious to see how much of the book had permeated
modern probability and statistics. (Note that the versions of the book evolved quite
considerably from the first to the fifth edition in 1825.) The following review is not
pretending at scholarly grounding the book within its academic surroundings and suc-
cessors, but is to be taken as a mere Bayesian excursion along its pages. A deeper
analysis of The´orie Analytique des Probabilite´s can be found in Dale (1999, pp. 250–
283). In particular, Andrew Dale discusses Bayesianly relevant supplements found in
later editions of The´orie Analytique des Probabilite´s, as well as connections with both
Bayes’ and Laplace’s Essays.
“Je m’attache surtout, a` de´terminer la probabilite´ des causes et des re´sultats in-
dique´s par e´ve´nemens conside´re´s en grand nombre.” P.S. Laplace, The´orie Analy-
tique des Probabilite´s, page 3.
I must first and foremost acknowledge I found the book rather difficult to read and
this for several reasons: (a) as always is the case for older books, the ratio text-to-
formulae is very high; (b) the themes in succession are often abruptly brought (i.e. not
always well-motivated) and uncorrelated with the previous ones; (c) the mathematical
notations are (unsurprisingly) 18th-century, so sums are indicated by S, exponentials
by c, and so on, while those symbols are also used as variables in other formulae; (d) I
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often missed the big picture and got mired into technical details, until they made sense
or until I gave up; (e) I never understood whether or not Laplace was interested in the
analytics like generating functions only to provide precise numerical approximations or
for their own sake. So a certain degree of disappointment in the end, most likely due to
my insufficient investment in the project (on which I only spent an Amsterdam/Calgary
flight and a few sleepless nights in Banff...), even though I got excited by finding the
bits and pieces about Bayesian estimation and testing.
2 Contents of The´orie Analytique des Probabilite´s
“Sa the´orie est une des choses les plus curieuses et les plus utiles que l’on ait
trouve´es sur les suites.” P.S. Laplace, The´orie Analytique des Probabilite´s, page
8.
The Livre Premier is about generating functions (Calcul des Fonctions ge´neratrices).
As such, it is not directly of interest, focusing on finite difference equations, even though
the techniques developped therein will be exploited in the second part. (There is an
interesting connection with Abrahama de Moivre, incidentally, since this older mathe-
matical giant used generating functions to derive binomial formulas. He is acknowledged
in Laplace’s preface by the above quote, Bellhouse, 2011.)
“La the´orie des probabilite´s consiste a` re´duire tous les e´ve´nemens qui peuvent
avoir lieu dans une circonstance donne´e a` un certain nombre de cas e´galement
possibles.” P.S. Laplace, The´orie Analytique des Probabilite´s, page 178.
The Livre Second is about probability theory, first about urn type problems, then
about asymptotic approximations. The introduction to this second part reflects the fa-
mous (almost mythical!) determinism of Laplace, where randomness is simply l’expression
de notre ignorance (yes, our ignorance as so expressed, page 177)... The intial pages
contain the basics of probability like the chain rule, the product rule, the conditional
probability and what we now call Bayes’ rule, even though it is not called as such in
The´orie Analytique des Probabilite´s. I did not find any mention of Thomas Bayes in the
book. However, when looking at the on-line version of the book, I realised to my dismay
that the 1814 edition has changed quite significantly, with an historical introduction to
the theory of probability, incl. the mention of Bayes. (Thus, the changes were not re-
stricted to the removal of the dedication to Napole´on-le-Grand [not longer appropriate
after Waterloo and the restauration of the monarchy!] and the change from Chancellier
du Se´nat [an honorific title under Napole´on Ier] to Pair du Royaume [an honorific title
under Louis XVIII], reflecting the well-known turncoat politics of Laplace!) An interest-
ing syntactic point is the paragraph where Laplace introduces the notion of expectation
(in the sense of Dicken’s Great Expectations), along with fears (”crainte”), and as in
Laplace’s Essai philosophique, he distinguishes between mathematical expectation and
moral expectation. (He later acknowledge Bernoulli’s priority, as discussed below.)
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“Nous traiterons d’abord les questions dans lesquelles les probabilite´s des e´ve´nemens
simples, sont donne´es; nous conside´rerons ensuite celles dans lesquelles ces prob-
abilite´s sont inconnues, et doivent eˆtre de´termine´es par les e´ve´nemens observe´s.”
P.S. Laplace, The´orie Analytique des Probabilite´s, page 188.
The above quote is the introduction to Chapter II which essentially consists in a
sequence of combinatorial problems solved by polynomial decompositions and approxi-
mated by the finite difference formulae of the first Livre. (Despite this enticing quote,
the chapter does not cover the statistical part.) While the accumulation of lottery and
urn problems is not exactly fascinating, to say the least, some entries highlight Laplace’s
analytical skills. For instance, a convoluted urn problem leads to an equally convoluted
integral (page 222) ∫
∞
0
xrn−ndx · (x− r)ne−x∫
∞
0
xrn−ndx · e−x
(0)
where Laplace uses a Laplace approximation to replace (0) with
(1− 1/n)n+1√
(1 − 1/n)2 + 2
rn
− 1
rn2
for N and rn large. The cdf is used in a convoluted (if labeled as “tre`s-simple” on
page 264!) derivation of an expectation of several variables. The chapter concludes
with reflections on an optimal voting system that relates to Condorcet’s (although no
mention is made of this political scientist in the book, even though Laplace owed his
position [at the age of 24!] in the Acade´mie Royale des Sciences to his intervention).
“On peut encore, par l’analyse des probabilite´s, ve´rifier l’existence ou l’influence
de certaines causes dont on a cru remarquer l’action sur les eˆtres organise´s.” P.S.
Laplace, The´orie Analytique des Probabilite´s, page 358.
Chapter III moves to asymptotic approximations and the law of large numbers for
frequencies, “cet important the´ore`me” (page 275). The beginning of the chapter shows
that the variation of the empirical frequency around the corresponding probability is
of order 1/
√
n, with a normal approximation to the coverage of the confidence interval.
Dale (1999) makes the crucial point (and I missed it!) that Laplace defines there a
confidence interval on a probability parameter p, by a Bayesian argument, i.e. by using
a flat prior on the probability parameter (page 254).
“On peut reconnaˆıtre l’effet tre`s-petit d’une cause constante, par une longue suite
d’observations dont les erreurs peuvent exce´der cette effet lui-meˆme.” P.S. Laplace,
The´orie Analytique des Probabilite´s, page 352.
Chapter IV extends the above law of large numbers to a sum of iid variables. It
then remarks that the most likely error is zero (which simply means that the mode of
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the standard normal distribution is indeed zero). It also contains a derivation of (a) the
posterior median as minimising the absolute error loss and (b) the empirical average
as minimising the squared error error or being the least square estimator (page 321).
I think Laplace uses a Fourier transform to derive the distribution of a weighted sum
(page 314). Laplace then proceeds to generalise this optimality result to a bivariate
quantity, obtaining again the least square estimate and computing a bivariate Gaussian
density on the way. And then comes the major step,! namely Laplace’s derivation of a
posterior distribution (page 334):
∏
i
ϕ(xi − θ)∫ ∏
i
ϕ(xi − θ) dθ
(with my notations), thus using a flat prior on the location parameter! This fundamen-
tal step is compounded by the introduction of a (not yet) Bayes estimator minimising
posterior absolute error loss and found to be the median of the posterior. In the next
pages, Laplace attempts to find the MAP (which is also the maximum likelihood es-
timator in this case), as an approximation to the posterior median (page 336). From
therein, he moves to identify the distribution for which the MAP is also the (arith-
metic) average, ending up with the normal distribution (page 338). (This result was to
be extended by J.M. Keynes, see Keynes, 1920, to different types of estimators.) The
chapter concludes with a defense of the arithmetic mean as a limiting Bayes estimator
that does not depend on the law of the errors.
“Pour de´terminer avec quelle probabilite´ cette cause est indique´e, concevons que
cette cause n’existe point.” P.S. Laplace, The´orie Analytique des Probabilite´s, page
350.
Chapter V starts with the computation of a p-value, nothing less! Laplace analyses
the likelihood (vraisemblance) of a non-zero effect by looking at the cdf of the obser-
vation under the null (page 361). The following pages discuss Laplace’s analysis of the
irregularities in celestial trajectories, like the perturbations between Saturn and Jupiter.
It argues in a philosophical if un-Popperian way about the importance of probabilistic
analysis (read statistics) for uncovering scientific facts (page 358).
“Laplace actually used the theory of probabilities as a method of discovery.” A.
de Morgan, Dublin Review, 1837.
In Chapter VI, De la probabilite´ des causes et des e´ve´nemens futurs, tire´s des
e´ve´nemens observe´s, Laplace develops his Bayesian (or Laplacian) perspective for draw-
ing inference about unknown probabilities. He uses a uniform prior (with an interesting
argument transferring the prior into the likelihood as to always consider this case, see
page 364).1 He then derives a normal approximation to the posterior (first term of the
1As pointed out by Jean-Louis Foulley (personnal communication), this idea of representing the
non-uniform prior as an additional set of data independent of the observation is very innovative. In
modern Bayesian statistics language, t leads to easy and useful interpretations for conjugate priors and
may even be viewed as the basic idea behind partial (intrinsic and fractional) Bayes Factors.
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Laplace approximation!, page 367). This chapter also contains the famous study on
the proportion ̺ of female births in Paris, using an approximation to the beta integral
to show that the (posterior) probability that is larger than 1/2 is negligible (“d’une
petitesse excessive”, page 380). Laplace also computes the posterior probability that
the probability of a male birth in London is larger than in Paris, which he finds equal
to 1-1/328269 (using a double integral and a continued fraction approximation!). He
then moves to the applications of these techniques to mortality tables and insurances,
exhibiting there a thematic connection (Bellhouse, 2011) with Abraham de Moivre (and
maybe even Bayes!). The chapter concludes by a computation of the posterior (or pre-
dictive!) probability that 1−̺ will remain larger than 1/2 in the next century, obtaining
a value of 0.782.
Chapter VII is a short chapter on biased coins and compounded experiments, not
directly related with Bayesian perspectives (Dale, 1999 extrapolates on this point, since
the imprecision on the coin biasedness can be seen as a prior). Chapter VIII is similarly
short, reproducing earlier normal approximations on averages of life durations. It also
contains an interesting study on the impact of removing the impact of smallpox on
the death rate. Chapter IX deals with expectations of simple functions for binomial
experiments and with their normal approximation, again exhibiting the above link with
de Moivre’s on life insurrances.
Chapter X returns to the notion of moral expectation mentioned both earlier and
in Laplace’s Essai Philosophique. The core (to solving the Saint Petersburg paradox)
is to use log(x) instead of x as a utility function, following Bernoulli’s derivation (now
mentioned on page 439).
3 Reflections
“In reviewing the general design of the work of Laplace, we desire to make the
description of a book mark the present state of a science.” A. de Morgan, Dublin
Review, 1837.
In conclusion, The´orie Analytique des Probabilite´s provides a fascinating historical
perspective on Laplace’s genius in framing probability and statistics within mathemat-
ical analysis and in deriving numerical approximations to intractable integrals. As put
by Augustus de Morgan in a praising if sometimes hilarious review of the book, “The´orie
des Probabilite´s is the Mont Blanc of mathematical analysis”. (Morgan considers that
the French national school of mathematics neglects to credit predecessors. It is quite
true that it is impossible to gather which results are original and which are not in
The´orie Analytique des Probabilite´s. He similarly thinks that the first part on gener-
ating functions is mostly useless for the second part. And that the introduction [in the
1814 edition] is the Essai Philosophique, whose final version is much enlarged compared
with this introduction. Interestingly, de Morgan also spends quite some time on the no-
tion of moral expectation.) As opposed to Thomas Bayes’ 1763 short essay,2 the book
2Dale (1999) compares Bayes’ and Laplace’s input, making the significant remark that Bayes con-
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by Laplace leads to a global vision of the role and practice of probability theory, as it
was then understood at the beginning of the 19th Century, and it can be argued the
The´orie Analytique des Probabilite´s shaped the field (or fields) for close to a hundred
years.3
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